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PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ERISA: AN ANOMALOUS
EFFECT OF ERISA'S PREEMPTION OF
COMMON LAW ACTIONS
This Note examines the effect of The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)1 on punitive damage claims2 connected
with employee pensions and benefits. The readiness of federal courts to
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.).
ERISA § 2 [29 U.S.C. § 1001] sets forth the goals and policies behind the statute:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans
in recent years has been rapid and substantial; ... that the continued well-being and se-
curity of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these
plans; ... [and] that despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with
long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of
vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum stan-
dards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised
benefits may be endangered.
[Congress will protect] the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries by requiring the disclosure and reporting ... of financial and other informa-
tion ... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts.
[Congress will further protect] the interests of participants by improving the equitable
character and the soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of
employees with significant periods of service, to meet minimum standards of funding, and
by requiring plan termination insurance.
See also Foreword to 1 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (1976) [hereinafter ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]:
Today, more than 30 million American workers are relying on private pension and welfare
plans as a major source of economic security in old age. The assets of private pension
arrangements ... [are] one of the largest sources of private capital in the economy....
But for the most part, this phenomenal growth was largely unregulated. While the ab-
sence of substantive requirements helped promote growth of the private system, the result-
ing plans set up difficult and sometimes insurmountable obstacles to plan participants.
Passage of this legislation is the end product of years of study and development by the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare....
[ERISA] responded to the recommendations of the Senate study and to the objectives of
a broad consensus for comprehensive reform. The new rules reflect a careful balance of
incentives and controls designed by Congress to improve the equitable character of private
plans while encouraging their future growth and development.
(statement by Chairman Williams, at iii).
For a brief overview of the statute, see G. BOREN, QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS
§ 1:04 (1983).
2. Punitive damage claims arise in various contexts related to ERISA. They have been in-
cluded with civil actions brought under section 502(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)], and they have been
included with common law claims brought in conjunction with ERISA claims. See infra notes 25-42
and accompanying text.
Although this Note focuses on punitive damages, the issues and arguments often apply as well to
"extracontractual" damages, which are awarded for injuries beyond the denial of employee benefits.
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preempt state common law actions with ERISA and the courts' hesi-
tancy to permit punitive damage claims in ERISA civil actions have had
a significant effect on causes of action which traditionally included puni-
tive damages.
Part I reviews the applicable statutory provision's and their historical
development, discusses various judicial treatments of punitive damage
claims, and explains the effect of Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Russell.4 Part II analyzes ERISA preemption of state statutory
and common law as it affects claims for punitive damages. Part III dis-
See infra notes 33-38, 49-60 and accompanying text (discussing the Russell case involving extracon-
tractual and punitive damages).
3. Section 514 [29 U.S.C. § 1144] (see infra Part lI.A) provides for the broad preemption of
state laws that "relate" to "employee benefit plans". The Supreme Court recently interpreted this
preemption to include many actions (e.g. fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or
intentional infliction of emotional distress) upon a finding that the action related to an "employee
benefit plan." See infra notes 49-60, 86-99 and accompanying text. The end result of ERISA, there-
fore, is that it preempts common law actions which formerly provided punitive damages. In some
sense, this leads to the peculiar result that ERISA might protect the defendants whom Congress
intended to punish. Accordingly, this Note will explain the interrelation of the issues of preemption,
common law actions, and punitive damages.
ERISA § 3(l)-(3) [29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)-(3)] defines "employee benefit plans" in terms of "welfare
plans" and "pension plans":
(I) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund,
or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer
or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund or program
was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship
or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal serv-
ices, or (B) any benefit described in section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947 [29 U.S.C. § 186(c)] (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance
to provide such pensions).
(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms "employee pension benefit
plan" and "pension plan" mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is
hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances
such plan, fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination
of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method
of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the
plan....
(3) The term "employee benefit plan" or "plan" means an employee welfare benefit plan or
an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan
and an employee pension benefit plan.
4. 105 S.Ct. 3085 (1985). The term "Russell" as used in this Note collectively refers to the
Ninth Circuit's decision at 722 F.2d 482 (see hifra notes 33-38) and the Supreme Court's decision at
105 S.Ct. 3085. (see infra, Part I.C.)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss3/4
1987] PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ERISA
cusses various arguments regarding the issue of punitive damages under
ERISA and proposes solutions based on the effect of ERISA's preemp-
tion of traditional common law causes of action.
I. HISTORY
A. The ERISA Civil Actions
ERISA section 502(a)5 outlines four main classes of plaintiffs: "par-
ticipants",6 "beneficiaries", 7 "fiduciaries",' and the "Secretary". 9 In ad-
dition, section 502(d)"° authorizes the employee benefit plan to sue and
be sued.II Sections 502(e) and (f)t2 confer federal court jurisdiction and
nationwide service of process, while section 502(g) 3 provides for the dis-
cretionary award of attorney fees and costs.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Section 502(a) provides as follows:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary- ...
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief
under section 409 [29 U.S.C. § 1109];
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropri-
ate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provision of this title
or the terms of the plan....
For an overview of the ERISA civil enforcement scheme, see generally G. BOREN, QUALIFIED
DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS §§ 16:11-:20 (1983).
6. Section 3(7) [29 U.S.C. § 1002(7)] defines a "participant" as:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an
employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from
an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer or members of such
organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.
7. Section 3(8) [29 U.S.C. § 1002(8)] defines a "beneficiary" as "a person designated by a
participant or by the terms of an employee benefit plan who is or may become entitled to a benefit
thereunder."
8. Section 3(21) [29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)] defines a "fiduciary" as "anyone who exercises any
discretionary authority or control in the management and administration of the plan and its assets or
who renders investment advice for compensation."
9. The "Secretary" is the Secretary of Labor. § 3(13) [29 U.S.C. § 1002(13)]. In addition,
§§ 502(h) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(h)] and 504 [29 U.S.C. § 1134] respectively give the Secretary authority
to intervene in civil actions brought by others to investigate past and suspected ERISA violations.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d).
11. For an interpretation of § 502(d) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)], see Pressroom Unions-Printers
League Income Sec. Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889 (2nd Cir. 1983) (holding that
§ 502(d) gave the plan ability to sue as an entity, but did not confer federal jurisdiction on the plan's
ERISA action).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e), (f).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
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Private ERISA actions seeking punitive damages have primarily arisen
under subsections (1), (2), or (3) of section 502(a).14 Section 502 (a)(1) 5
provides two types of relief. an action against the "administrator" 16 per-
sonally' 7 for failure to furnish information; and an action to recover ben-
efits due, to enforce rights, and to clarify future rights pursuant to the
terms of the plan.' 8 Section 502(a)(2), t9 which provides relief pursuant
to section 409,20 defines the defendant as a fiduciary with respect to the
plan, and describes the liability for breach of the fiduciary duty.2 ' Fi-
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1)-(3). But see, ag., Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp.
534 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (action under § 510 [29 U.S.C. § 1140] by employee against employer for
retalitory firing of the employee after employee made claim for benefits).
15. 29 U.S.C. § I132(a)(1).
16. Section 3(16) [29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)] defines "administrator" as follows:
(A) The term "administrator" means-
(i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the
plan is operated;
(ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or
(iii) in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a plan sponsor
cannot by identified, such other person as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.
(B) The term "plan sponsor" means (i) the employer in the case of an employee benefit
plan established or maintained by a single employer, (ii) the employee organization in the
case of a plan established or maintained by an employee organization, or (iii) in the case of
a plan established or maintained by two or more employers or jointly by one or more
employers and one or more employees organizations, the association, committee, joint
board of trustees, or other similar group of representatives of the parties who establish or
maintain the plan.
17. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(A) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A)] refers to relief under subsection (c) [29
U.S.C. § 1132(c)]:
Any administrator who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any information which
such administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish to a participant or benefici-
ary ... may in the court's discretion be personally liable to such participant or beneficiary
in the amount of up to $100 a day from the date of such failure or refusal, and the court
may in its discretion order such other relief as it deems proper.
18. ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)].
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
20. ERISA § 409(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)] provides as follows:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibili-
ties, obligations, or duties imposed ... by this title shall be personally liable to make good
to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such
plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through the use of such assets of
the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as
the court may deem appropriate....
21. The fiduciary's duty is defined in ERISA § 404(a)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)]:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties ... solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries and:
(A) for the exclusive purposes of ... providing benefits to participants and their benefi-
ciaries and ... defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
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nally, section 502(a)(3) 22 provides general relief. It refers to injunctive
and "other appropriate equitable relief" for participants, beneficiaries,
and fiduciaries, and describes no particular defendant.23
Because section 502 does not specifically mention punitive damages,
courts have had to construe the statute to decide such claims. The re-
sults have not been consistent. The following discussion outlines the ju-
dicial treatment of punitive damages under ERISA. First, the
constructions prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Russell;24 next,
the Supreme Court's analysis in Russell; and finally, the post-Russell
interpretations.
B. Pre-Russell Judicial Treatment of Punitive Damages
Before the Supreme Court decided Russell, the circuits split on the
question whether ERISA provides punitive damages.25 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. 2 6
was the leading case holding that punitive damages were available. The
Eighth Circuit's decision in Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.27 was
the leading case holding that punitive damages were not available. The
Eighth Circuit's decision in Monson v. Century Manufacturing Corp.28
represented a third line of cases which allowed punitive damages under
common law actions brought in addition to ERISA claims. Prior to Rus-
sell, therefore, a plaintiff possibly could receive punitive damage awards
under section 502(a)(2)29 based on the section 409(a)30 fiduciary liability.
Section 409(a) provides three remedies for breach of the statutory fidu-
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such
documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this title or title IV.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(a)(3). See supra note 5 for pertinent parts of the subsection.
23. As the discussion below of the various cases demonstrates, there is a wide range of potential
defendants under this provision: e.g., plan fiduciaries, plan administrators, plan insurers, as well as
the plan and the employer.
24. 105 S.Ct. 3085 (1985).
25. Compare Jiminez v. Pioneer Diecasters, 549 F. Supp. 677, 680 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (punitive
damages allowed under § 409); [29 U.S.C. § 1109] with Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653
F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir. 1981) (punitive damages not allowed with ERISA claims). See also Rus-
sell, 722 F.2d at 491 (listing cases with different results on the punitive damages issue).
26. 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983).
27. 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981).
28. 739 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1984).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
1987]
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ciary duty.3 1 The first two remedies require the fiduciary to make good
any losses to the plan and to restore any profits. The third remedy, a
"catch-all" provision and the basis for punitive damages, specifies that
the fiduciary "shall be subject to such other equitable and remedial relief
as the court may deem appropriate."32
Applying section 409(a), the Ninth Circuit in Russell v. Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co. 33 held that a beneficiary or participant could
bring a private action34 against a fiduciary for any breach of the fiduci-
ary's responsibilities, duties, or obligations under ERISA. Although the
court found that ERISA preempted 35 several state actions which the
plaintiff brought,36 the court held that the section 409 fiduciary duties
applied to the handling of claims and to the management of plan assets.37
For any breach of these duties, the plaintiff beneficiary could recover all
proximately caused damages, including extracontractual damages not
limited to the amount of benefits lost, and punitive damages in appropri-
ate circumstances.38
31. See supra note 20 for full text of § 409(a).
32. § 409(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)].
33. 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983).
34. The action was brought under §502(a)(2) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)] and claimed relief avail-
able under the remedy in § 409(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)].
35. 722 F.2d at 487-88.
36. Id. at 484 (the plaintiff brought state actions for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of con-
tract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
37. Id. at 488.
38. 722 F.2d at 489-92. The employer terminated the salary continuation benefits due but con-
tinued to pay long-term disability benefits. Id. at 487. The plaintiff claimed damages caused by the
employer's improper handling of her claim and her wrongful termination. Thus, she claimed ex-
tracontractual damages outside the scope of § 502(a)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)]. The Ninth Circuit
granted the requested relief, including damages for mental and emotional harm manifested by physi-
cal symptoms. 722 F.2d at 490. Finally, the court held that punitive damages are available "in only
very limited circumstances [where the fiduciary] ... acted with actual malice or wanton indifference
to the rights of the participant or beneficiary." Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit supported its reasoning in Russell with a line of district court decisions that
permitted punitive damages under ERISA. See, eg., Jiminez v. Pioneer Diecasters, 549 F. Supp. 677
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (permitted punitive damages against plan fiduciaries under §§ 502(a)(2) and 409(a)
[29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2) and 1109(a)]); Bobo v. 1950 Pension Plan, 548 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Wis.
1982) (claim for punitive damages under § 409(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)], along with claim for mental
anguish against the employer as fiduciary); Eaton v. D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743 (D. D.C. 1980)
(action by trustees against plan fiduciaries for punitive damages under § 409(a) [29 U.S.C.
§ 1109(a)]); Bittner v. Sadoff& Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (punitive damages
awarded under § 510 [29 U.S.C. § 1140] by employee against employer for retaliatory firing of the
employee).
Later cases decided before the Supreme Court's reversal of Russell followed the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning. See, eg., Kuntz v. Reese, 760 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1985) (punitive damages under ERISA
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss3/4
1987] PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND ERISA
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.3 9 held that ERISA preempted a
state common law claim for tortious interference with a contract. 40 The
court, in refusing to allow punitive damages, reasoned that they were not
appropriate with the particular cause of action and questioned whether
ERISA provided for punitive damages in any case.4 1 Dependahl appar-
ently chose to follow the line of district court cases that held punitive
damages were not available under ERISA.42
The third group of pre-Russell cases awarded punitive damages based
on common law claims that accompanied ERISA claims. Contrary to its
held appropriate in certain cases); Winterrowd v. David Freedman and Co., Inc., 724 F.2d 823 (9th
Cir. 1984) (upholding punitive damages award in action by plan administrator against an employer
for wanton and willful failure to make required contributions to a pension plan). Two later district
court opinions, Miner v. Int'l Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 601 F. Supp. 1390,
1393 (D. Col. 1986) and Gilliken v. Hughes, 609 F. Supp. 178, 182 (D. Del. 1985), allowed punitive
damage claims under ERISA to proceed, and followed Russell by limiting such damages to circum-
stances where the fiduciary acted with actual malice or wanton indifference to the rights of the
beneficiaries.
39. 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981).
40. Id. at 1214-16.
41. Id. at 1216-17. Dependahl held that ERISA preempted the tort of interference with con-
tract. In deciding to disallow the punitive damage action, the court focused as much on the nature
of the tort as on the ERISA civil actions:
We do not think punitive damages are provided for in ERISA. Ordinarily punitive dam-
ages are not presumed; they are not the norm; and nowhere in ERISA are they mentioned.
If Congress had desired to provide for punitive damages, it could have easily so stated, as it
has in other acts. However, we need not decide this issue, because we find that punitive
damages are inappropriate in this case under either 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) or § 1140.... We
believe that, as a matter of federal common law, an award of punitive damages is inappro-
priate to a claim of interference with employee benefit plans.
Id. at 1216 (emphasis added). The court further found that punitive damages were not necessary as
an additional deterrent to breaches of employee benefit contracts. Id. at 1216. Although Dependahl
never clearly articulated its position, later courts have cited this dicta for the principle that punitive
damages are not proper under ERISA. See eg., Winterrowd v. David Freedman and Co, Inc., 724
F.2d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining the Dependahl holding on punitive damages and stating
that the Eighth Circuit's stance on punitive damages was dicta). Cf Hollenbeck v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 605 F. Supp. 421, 435-36 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (district court within the Eighth Circuit stated that
it was unlikely that the Eighth Circuit would award punitive damages under ERISA, but that if it
[the district court] were "writing on a clean slate," it would consider punitive damages for a wanton
or malicious breach of fiduciary duty).
42. See, eg., Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Hum v.
Retirement Fund Trust, 424 F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1976). But cf Miner v. Int's Typographical
Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 601 F. Supp. 1390, 1391-93 (D. Col. 1986), where the court ex-
amined this line of cases and compared them to those cases which permitted punitive damages. The
Miner court concluded, from the differences in the facts in the two lines of cases, that punitive
damages were proper when the plaintiff showed "actual malice or wanton indifference" to the right
of the beneficiaries and participants. Id. at 1393. This analysis, following the Ninth Circuit's Russell
decision, suggests that the law in the two lines of cases was actually consistent, but that the facts of
the cases may have caused the inconsistent results.
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decision in Dependahl, the Eighth Circuit in Monson v. Century Manu-
facturing Co.43 affirmed a punitive damage award based on a fraud claim
brought along with ERISA claims. Employees brought the fraud claim
against their employer for misrepresenting the amount of money the em-
ployer was contributing to a profit sharing plan." The plaintiffs received
compensatory damages under the fraud action and under ERISA for
breach of fiduciary duty,45 and additionally received punitive damages
based on the conduct underlying the misrepresentations. 46
Unlike Russell and Dependahl, Monson did not address the preemption
issue.47 This result is similar to other cases where the preemption issue
has arisen under claims that only indirectly relate to employee benefits.
On these facts, some courts have held that ERISA does not preempt such
common law actions and that punitive damages are proper.48
C. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell49 the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, held that section 40950 provides only
for recovery of damages by the plan, 1 and refused to imply a private
43. 739 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1984).
44. Id. at 1300-03.
45. Id. at 1303.
46. Id. at 1305.
47. But see Hollenbeck v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 605 F. Supp. 421, 435 (E.D. Mo. 1984),
where the district court explained Monson by asserting that the fraud action arose under a profit
sharing plan not covered by ERISA, while the ERISA claim arose under the ERISA governed
employee pension plan. According to Hollenbeck, the district court's opinion in Monson clearly
showed this distinction, although it is not apparent from the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Monson.
48. See, eg., Shaver v. N.C. Monroe Constr. Co., 63 N.C. App. 605, 306 S.E.2d 519 (1983)
(action for fraud with punitive damages claims based on alleged misrepresentations by the employer
to the employee regarding the pension plan for the purpose of inducing employment); Hepler v.
CBS, Inc., 39 Wash. App. 838, 696 P.2d 596 (1985) (action for fraud with punitive damages,
although unsuccessful, was not preempted). Accord Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.
Supp. 388 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (although no punitive damages claims asserted, actions for fraudulent
misrepresentation of the nature of a benefits plan, refusal in bad faith to pay a legitimate claim, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress all held not preempted by ERISA).
49. 105 S.Ct. 3085 (1985).
For an extensive discussion of the Russell case, see generally Note, Participant and Beneficiary
Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Damages After Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1014 (1986).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
51. 105 S.Ct. at 3089-92. See supra note 3 for the ERISA definition of a "plan".
The Court reasoned that the language of § 409(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), see supra note 20], by
explicitly naming the plan as the entity to which the breaching fiduciary would be liable by the first
and second provisions of § 409(a), implicitly limited the liability under the third "catch-all" remedy
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss3/4
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cause of action under that section. 2 The Court expressly reserved the
question of whether any other section of ERISA provided punitive or
extracontractual damages. 3 Thus the Court left unanswered the ques-
tions whether section 502(a)(3) might provide such relief54 and whether a
plan could recover or pay punitive damages thereunder.5 5
Writing for four members of the Court,56 Justice Brennan concurred
to emphasize the limited scope of the majority's holding. 7 He expressed
his concern that future courts might apply the majority's broad dicta and
erroneously restrict all fiduciary liability to the plan alone.5 8 In regard to
judicial construction of ERISA remedies, Brennan noted the difference
between implying private causes of action in the provisions and constru-
ing the private causes of action explicitly provided. 9 He said the courts,
in "fine tuning" the details of section 502(a) civil actions, should look to
to the plan as well. This holding overruled the prior decisions that had relied on the "catch-all"
phrase of § 409(a) in order to award punitive damages in private actions. See supra notes 29-34 and
accompanying text.
52. 105 S.Ct. at 3092-94. The Court rejected the plaintiff's alternative argument that the four-
factor analysis in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1978), created an implied private cause of action for
extracontractual damages. Although two of the four factors-plaintiff being a member of the statu-
torily protected class and lack of state law impediment because of ERISA's preemption-were in the
plaintiff's favor, the Court held that the other two factors, legislative intent and legislative scheme,
defeated the plaintiff's argument. The absence of clear legislative history supporting punitive dam-
ages under ERISA and the "carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a)"
convinced the Court that § 409(a) had no implied private cause of action. 105 S.Ct. at 3093.
53. 105 S.Ct. at 3089 n.5.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). While the "catch-all" remedy in § 409(a) states "other equitable or
remedial relief," the § 502(a) remedy is "other appropriate equitable relief." See supra notes 5 and
20.
55. See Sanchez, Punitive Damages Under ERISA, 13 W. STATE U. L. REV. 413 (1986). Cf.
McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100 (3rd Cir. 1986) (action on behalf of plan for breach of fiduci-
ary duty); Hood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 460 So.2d 1227 (Ala. 1984) (punitive damages not
recoverable against plan).
56. 105 S.Ct. at 3094-99 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun).
57. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
58. 105 S.Ct. at 3095. In Brennan's opinion, § 404(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1104(a), see supra note 21]
embodied Congress' intent to incorporate fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA such that
§ 502(a)(3) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)] would provide "appropriate equitable relief" directly to a bene-
ficiary when a plan fiduciary breached the § 404(a) duties in claims administration and in the man-
agement of plan assets. 105 S.Ct. at 3095-97.
Brennan looked to the legislative history of ERISA and to the principles of trust law. 105 S.Ct. at
3096-97 & nn.6-10. See infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
59. 105 S.Ct. at 3097-99. Brennan disagreed with the majority's view "that Congress 'crafted'
ERISA with 'carefully integrated' remedies so as to create an 'interlocking, interrelated, and interde-
pendent remedial scheme' that courts should not 'fine-tune,"' Id. at 3097. Rather, he interpreted
"other appropriate equitable relief" to mean that the courts had the duty to fill in the details and
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traditional trust law principles and remedies to determine the range of
remedies available to redress ERISA violations.6"
D. Post-Russell Interpretations
After Russell, the lower federal courts have consistently denied puni-
tive damage claims under ERISA.61 Although plaintiffs have asserted
their punitive damage claims under sections 502(a)(3) and 404(a)62 and
although courts looked to trust law principles for answers to the punitive
damage issue,63 the decisions have consistently denied the claims.64
define the range of appropriate remedies. Congress had anticipated that a body of federal common
law would develop to define rights and obligations pertaining to ERISA. Id. at 3098 & nn.13-14.
60. In Brennan's opinion, the legislative history indicated that the scope of "other appropriate
equitable relief" in § 502(a)(3), should parallel the extent to which previously developed trust and
pension law provided the beneficiary with remedies above and beyond the benefits withheld. Because
little federal law existed to guide the courts in trust law principles, they would have to incorporate
state trust law remedies into federal rules of decision. 105 S.Ct. at 3098-99 & n.18.
Brennan did not answer the punitive damage question specifically, nor did he decide whether
ERISA would ever provide extracontractual damages. However, he did say that courts should
adopt trust law remedies as long as they not conflict with other ERISA provisions and "would best
effectuate the underlying purposes of ERISA-enforcement of strict fiduciary standards of care in
the administration of all aspects of pension plans and promotion of the best interests of participants
and beneficiaries." Id. at 3099 (emphasis added).
61. At least four of the circuits have rejected punitive damage claims with rationales based on
trust law, fiduciary duty principles, or equity principles. Klemhans v. Lisle Savings Profit Trust, 810
F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigon
Enter., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1298 (1987); Hancock v. Mont-
gomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1986); Powell v. Chesapeake and
Potomic Tel. Co. Va., 780 F.2d 419 (4th cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2892 (1986).
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 (a)(3) and 1104(a). See supra notes 5 and 21. See, e.g., Simmons v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 641 F. Supp. 675 (D. Col. 1986); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report,
Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1986).
63. Courts followed Brennan's advice by analyzing trust law in order to decide whether ex-
tracontractual damages are proper, but the conclusions drawn by the courts appear contrary to what
Brennan had in mind. See supra note 60. See, e.g., Powell v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of
Va., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985) (trust law equitable remedies do not include extracontractual
and punitive damages); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143, 1167 (D.D.C.
1986) ("equitable" remedies as suggested by trust law and § 502(a)(3) can include "damages," but
only to the extent of benefits denied).
64. Compare Unitis v. JFC Acquisition Co., 643 F. Supp. 454, 462 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding no
punitive damages because no wanton or willful behavior alleged; but noting possibility that breach of
fiduciary duty, as under trust law, could rise to level of independent tort) and Schoenholtz v.
Doniger, 628 F. Supp. 1420, 1430-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (fact finding of willful and intentional
breaches of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages not precluded) with Boesl v. Suburban Trust &
Savings Bank, 642 F. Supp. 1503, 1516 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (after Russell punitive damages probably
never recoverable by beneficiary or participant).
Another question left unanswered by Russell-whether the plan itself could recover punitive dam-
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Russell ended awards of punitive damages based on section 409. The
implication of the post-Russell decisions is that a court probably will not
award punitive damages under any section of ERISA. After Russell, the
sole option that remained for the plaintiff who wished to make a claim
for punitive damages was to bring a common law action. If the plaintiff
could avoid ERISA preemption, then the Russell implications would be
irrelevant to the success of the punitive damages claim. Accordingly,
this discussion now turns to the preemption issue.
II. PREEMPTION
A. Section 514: Background
Section 514(a) states that "the provisions of [ERISA] shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan... ."65 The Supreme Court has indicated that this
broad provision preempts any state law that relates to employee benefit
plans. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.66 the Court reasoned that by us-
ing "relate to," Congress intended to preempt more than just state laws
specifically affecting employee benefit plans.67
Section 514(b), 68 however, exempts state insurance laws from the pre-
emption of section 514(a). In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massa-
ages-has also been answered by at least one court in the negative. Sommers Drug Stores Co. Em-
ployee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). According to § 514(c)(1) [29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1)], "'State law' in-
cludes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having effect of law, of any
State .. "
See generally Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An
Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEx. L. R. 1313 (1984).
66. 103 S.Ct. 2890 (1983).
67. Id. at 2900. The Court refused to limit ERISA's preemption to state laws dealing specifi-
cally with employee benefits or state laws that conflict with ERISA provisions. See also Alessi v.
Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 101 S.Ct. 1895 (1981).
68. Subsection (b) of § 514 [29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)] provides as follows:
(b) Construction and application....
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall be construed
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking or securities. (B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) [29
U.S.C. § 1003(a)], which is not exempt under section 4(b) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)] (other
than a plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or insurer,
bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance
or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance compa-
nies, or investment companies. ...
Subsection (b)(2)(A) is the "savings" clause and subsection (b)(2)(B) is the "deemer" clause. The
"savings" clause has the effect of "saving" insurance law from preemption by ERISA. The
Washington University Open Scholarship
600 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 65:589
chusett, 69 the Supreme Court held that ERISA did not preempt a state
statute regulating employee benefits when applied to an insurer from
whom an employer purchased insurance as part of an employee benefits
plan.70 The Court acknowledged the difference in treatment arising
under Metropolitan Life for insured and uninsured plans, but declared
that Congress must resolve this problem.7 Courts extended this effect of
the insurance "savings" clause to common law claims.72
"deemer" clause "deems" employee benefit plans not to be insurance companies, thus, they fall
outside the "savings" clause and normal ERISA preemption applies.
Moore v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1986) set up a three
step analysis for deciding whether ERISA preempts a cause of action against an insurance company.
First, the court must decide whether the laws "relate" to an employee benefit plan; and, if so, ERISA
possibly preempts the laws. Second, the court must decide whether the laws regulate insurance; and,
if so, ERISA does not preempt them because of the "savings" clause. Finally, the court must decide
whether the "deemer" clause prevents the defendant from being deemed an insurance company; and,
if so, ERISA preempts the law even if it could have been found to have regulated insurance. This
analysis caused the anomaly discussed infra at notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
69. 105 S.Ct. 2380 (1985).
70. Id. at 2389-93.
71. Id. at 2393. See also Eversole v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1162 (C.D. Cal.
1980).
The court in Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311, 1312 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107
S.Ct. 1549 (1987), described the ways by which an employer could choose to fund an employee
benefit plan:
[C]ongress authorized employers to create for their employees welfare benefit plans, includ-
ing health and disability plans.... The employer may create or "fund" these plans in any
one of three ways: (1) the employer absorbs the entire risk of loss, thereby becoming a self-
insurer, (2) the employer purchases a group insurance policy from a commercial insurance
company, or (3) the employer self-insures to a ceratin monetary amount and purchases
from an insurance company a so-called "stop loss" policy to cover any claim over that
amount.
770 F.2d at 1312 n.2. The employer in Dedeaux used the second method. For an example of an
employer using the third method, see Hutchinson v. Benton Casing Ser., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 831, 838
n.2. (S.D. Miss. 1985).
72. Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S.Ct. 1549 (1987);
Simmons v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 641 F. Supp. 675 (D. Col. 1986). Both Dedeaux and Sir.
mons followed Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 105 S.Ct. 2380 (1985), and held that ERISA did
not preempt the plaintiff's common law actions against the insurers of their employers' benefit plans.
The Dedeaux court rejected the defendant insurance company's assertion that ERISA preempted
the plaintiff's common law claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. The
insurance company unsuccessfully argued that Congress intended to establish national uniformity in
handling ERISA plans by creating a broad preemption provision, that the "insured"/"uninsured"
distinction caused inequitable results (see supra note 71), and that the court should distinguish
"traditional" insurance laws from general laws affecting insurance. 770 F.2d at 1314-16. The court
held that the clear language of the "savings" clause, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it in
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., required that the common law claims were not preempted even
though that means that some actions created by ERISA § 502(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] would be
duplicated by state common law actions. 770 F.2d at 1316-17. This consequence, the court said,
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Clearly section 514 preempts state statutues governing pensions and
other employee benefits; this Note examines the degree to which ERISA
preempts state common law. The extent to which ERISA actually did
preempt common law actions was unclear prior to the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.73 Even in general
common law actions where the insurance "savings" clause has no effect,
courts were not consistent in applying section 514. While some courts
answered the preemption question in the affirmative,74 other courts
looked more closely at the facts and concluded that ERISA did not pre-
empt the common law claim.7 5
B. Common Law Actions Preempted by Section 514 Prior to Pilot Life
ERISA has preempted various common law causes of action and state
statutes.76 For example, courts have held that ERISA preempted con-
tract law, 77 tort law, 78 and trust and fiduciary duty law.79 Other courts,
was a concern for Congress. 770 F.2d at 1317. See also Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 763 F.2d
216 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (1987)
(holding improper the removal to federal court of common law action against insurer of an employee
benefits plan; decided by Supreme Court in conjunction with Dedeaux). The Supreme Court's deci-
sions on the appeals of the Dedeaux and Taylor case are discussed infra in Part II.C.
The Simmons case followed Dedeaux and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass. and held that the
plaintiff's common law actions (breach of fair dealing and good faith, breach of insurance policy,
defamation, and outrageous conduct) against the insurer survived preemption. 641 F. Supp. at 680.
Accordingly, the plaintiff proceeded with the common law claims for compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at 683-86. The court dismissed the plaintiff's ERISA claims for extracontractual and
punitive damages against the employer and plan administrator. Id. at 680-83.
Accord Hood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 460 So.2d 1227 (Ala. 1984) (holding that "bad faith
refusal to pay" claim against insurance company was not preempted by ERISA because of the insur-
ance "savings" clause). Cf. Moore v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.
1986) (action against insurance company not preempted because it was just the plan administrator
and not an insurer).
73. 107 S.Ct. 1549 (1987).
74. See, ag., Powell v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985);
Russell v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983).
75. See eg., Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Cal. 1981); Cornell
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Mushlin, 70 A.D.2d 123, 420 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1979); Shaver v. N.C. Monroe Constr.
Co., 63 N.C. App. 605, 306 S.E.2d 519 (1983); Shaw v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 276 Pa. Super.
220, 419 A.2d 175 (1980); Hepler v. CBS, Inc., 39 Wash. App. 838, 696 P.2d 596 (1985).
76. See e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 105 S.Ct. 2380 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2890 (1983). Contra Martori Bros. Distribs. v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d
1349 (9th Cir. 1986).
77. See, ag., Ahne v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 640 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Wis. 1986); Nolan v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
78. See, ag., Russell v. Mass., Mutual Life Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983); Dumac
Forestry Servs., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 637 F. Supp. 529 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
Washington University Open Scholarship
602 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 65:589
however, have reached contrary conclusions.80
In attempting to define the preemption boundaries of ERISA over
state law, courts utilized various tests. Some courts used a "direct rela-
tionship test": ERISA preempts common law actions "directly related"
to employee benefit plans, but it does not preempt those claims that only
"indirectly relate" thereto."1 Other courts have considered several fac-
tors including: the extent to which the law fell within the state's tradi-
tional domain, the extent to which the purpose or effect of the law
impinged on employee benefit plans, the extent of the law's incompatibil-
ity with ERISA, and the extent to which the asserted rights arose under
an employee benefit plan. 2 The decisions after Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
79. See, e.g., Light v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., 790 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1986); Powell
v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985).
80. See supra note 75.
81. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2890 (1983), where the Supreme Court stated
the broad effect of ERISA's preemption, but noted that limits exist:
some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner to warrant a finding that the law "relates to" the plan.... The present litigation
plainly does not present a borderline question, and we express no views about where it
would be appropriate to draw the line.
Id. at 2901 n.21.
See also Martori Bros. Distribs. v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1986), where the
court discussed at length the preemption issue. "[The law] is preempted if it both 'relates' to an
ERISA plan and 'purports to regulate, directly or indirectly' ERISA plans." Id. at 1356. The court
examined past preemption cases and concluded:
[S]tate laws that have been found to be preempted by section 514(a) because they "relate"
to ERISA plans fall into four categories. First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or
terms of ERISA plans. Second, laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting
requirements for ERISA plans. Third, laws that provide rules for the calculation of the
amount of benefits to be paid under ERISA plans. Fourth, laws and common-law rules
that provide remedies for misconduct growing out of the administration of the ERISA
plan. The principle underlying all of these decisions would appear to be that the state law
is preempted by section 514(a) if the conduct sought to be regulated by the state law is
"part of the administration of an employee benefit plan"; that is, the state law is preempted
if it regulates the matters regulated by ERISA: disclosure, funding, reporting, vesting, and
enforcement of benefit plans.
Id. at 1356-58 (citations omitted, quoting Scott v. Gulf Oil Co. 754 F.2d 1499, 1505 (4th Cir. 1985)).
82. E.g., Cornell Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Mushlin, 70 A.D.2d 123, 130-31, 420 N.Y.S.2d 231, 236
(1979).
See also Benvenuto v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co, 643 F. Supp. 87, 92 (D.N.J. 1986) (state's impor-
tant interest in protecting its citizens cited for holding that ERISA did not preempt claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, while the other common law claims were); Provience v. Valley
Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388, 391 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (in addition to the "direct/indirect"
inquiry, the court noted the factors of whether the law was of "general application" and was a
matter "of important state concern"); Shaver v. N.C. Monroe constr. Co., 63 N.C. App. 605, 306
S.E.2d 519 (1983) (following Mushlin and Provience).
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Inc.," however, gave only cursory scrutiny to the preemption issue and
adopted the Supreme Court's broad language in Delta thereby preempt-
ing almost any common law action.84 The one remaining preemption
issue that courts addressed fully prior to Pilot Life was the effect of the
insurance law "savings" and "deemer" clauses."
C. Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux
In two recent cases decided on the same day, Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Taylor86 and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,87 the
Supreme Court further expanded the scope of ERISA preemption.8 In
Metropolitan Life the Supreme Court held that a state law claim was
removable to federal courts due to ERISA preemption if it obviously re-
lated to an employee benefit plan, even if the complaint purportedly
stated only common law claims.89 Pilot Life spoke directly to the ques-
tions of ERISA preemption of common law actions and the meaning of
the insurance "savings" and "deemer" clauses.
The plaintiff in Pilot Life, alleging improper processing of his claim for
employee benefits, originally brought state common law actions against
the insurer because punitive damages would be unavailable with ERISA
83. 103 S.Ct. 2890 (1983).
84. See, e.g., Powell v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985):
In this case, none of the state laws under which Powell claims relief have any intrinsic
connection with employee benefit plans. The question is therefore whether state law claims
which relate to the administration of an ERISA-governed plan, but which arise under
general state laws which themselves have no impact on employee benefit plans, are within
the scope of ERISA preemption. Given the "unparalleled breadth" of the preemption
clause ... and the broad remedial policy of ERISA, we hold that state laws, insofar as
they are invoked by beneficiaries claiming relief for injuries arising out of the administra-
tion of employee benefit plans, "relate to" such plans and, absent an applicable exemption,
are preempted by ERISA.
Id. at 421 (citation omitted).
See also Moore v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1986)
(very limited discussion of the "relates to" part of the preemption issue with an insurance company
defendant); Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd., 107 S.Ct. 1549
(1987) (same).
It should be noted that Shaw and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Masm dealt with the preemption of
state statutes that directly affected employee benefits. Lower courts have cited the broad language in
these cases to preempt common law causes of action.
85. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
86. 107 S.Ct. 1542 (1987).
87. 107 S.Ct. 1549 (1987).
88. For a discussion of the court of appeals decisions in these two cases, see supra note 72.
89. 107 S.Ct. at 1547-48.
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claims.9" The Fifth Circuit held that his bad faith claim and demand for
punitive damages were "saved" from preemption because the defendant
was an insurance company. 91 The Supreme Court reversed and held that
the law underlying this claim, the Mississippi law of bad faith, was not a
law that "regulates insurance" for purposes of the ERISA savings
clause.9
2
The Court's analysis in Pilot Life left virtually no room for arguing
that a common law action should not be preefnpted by ERISA. The
Court held that a cause of action relates to a plan if it has a "connection
with or reference to" an employee benefit plan.93 To answer the insur-
ance law savings clause, the Court examined the law behind the cause of
action with a two-part test. 94 First, a "common-sense view" of the lan-
guage of the savings clause convinced the Court that the law of bad faith
did not "regulate insurance."95 Second, the Court used case law from
90. See infra note 103.
91. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
92. 107 S.Ct. 1553-55.
93. 107 S.Ct. 1553 (following Metropolitan Life, 421 U.S. at 739, and Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97).
But cf Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 107 S.Ct. 2211 (1987). In this case the Court, in a
5-4 decision, held that ERISA did not preempt a Maine statute requiring employers to pay severance
pay to employees laid off due to plant closings. This decision affirmed the Maine Supreme Judicial
Courts' decision that the law was not preempted, but on different grounds. The Maine Court found
that the law created an employee benefits plan, but because no employer created the plan, it did not
fit the express language of ERISA §§ 3 and 4 [29 U.S.C. §§ 1002-1003] that referred to plans created
by employers or employee organizations. Director v. Fort Halifax Packing Co., 5 10 A.2d 1054, 1059
(Me. 1986).
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan disagreed with the Maine court and asserted that the
law neither established nor required employers to maintain employee benefit plans. 107 S.Ct. at
2215. Instead, the Court held that this law related only to employee benefits, and not to "any em-
ployee benefit plan" as required by section 514. Id. The Court differentiated this case from previous
cases involving state statutes requiring certain employee benefits on the ground that this law imposed
no conflicting administrative obligations on employers. 107 S.Ct. at 2216-19.
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Scalia. 107 S.Ct. at 2223-25. White argued that the statute clearly imposed a benefit
plan on employers, that the fact that they did not have to set up any particular administrative proce-
dures was irrelevant, and that the plan created by the statute was clearly preempted by ERISA
§ 514. Id.
This case is facially distinguishable from the focus of this Note because it did not deal with com-
mon law causes of action. The majority's rationale, however, does present arguments against pre-
emption: a plaintiff could argue that a common law claim may relate only to benefits and not the
plan; in addition, one can argue that an employer need not set up any particular administrative
scheme to handle potential tort claims. Applying this rationale to a common law claim would
conflict with the holding in Pilot Life.
94. 107 S.Ct. at 1553.
95. 107 S.Ct. at 1554.
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the McCarran-Ferguson Act96 to decide that this state law was not one
that affected the "business of insurance. '9 7 Thus, according to the Pilot
Life analysis, the question of whether a common law claim is preempted
is answered with a factual inquiry (the Court looked to the cause of ac-
tion itself and the circumstances that gave rise to it), but the insurance
savings clause exception to preemption is answered with a legal inquiry
(the Court looked at the law behind the cause of action in the abstract).
With such an analysis it is doubtful whether any common law cause of
action could ever satisfy the ERISA savings clause.98 Finally, the court
justified its holding by referencing Congress' intent that ERISA have a
wide and pervasive preemptive impact.99
D. The Effect on Punitive Damage Actions
Before Russell, one court reasoned that ERISA should preempt a state
law fraud action because the plaintiff could seek the same remedies, in-
cluding punitive damages, under section 409."°° After Russell, a court
used Brennan's concurring opinion for the proposition that preemption
did not completely foreclose the plaintiff's remedies. 101 The reasoning in
these two cases demonstrates the anomalous result that ERISA's pre-
emption has had on punitive damage actions: The federal courts have
brought many common law actions under ERISA's umbrella, but in do-
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 etseq.
97. 107 S.Ct. at 1554-55. This "business of insurance" test involved three inquiries: first,
whether the practice transfers or spreads the policyholder's risk; second, whether it is an integral
part of the insurer/insured relationship; and third, whether it is limited to insurance industry enti-
ties. Id. at 1553-54. The Court decided that the Mississippi law of bad faith may have met only the
second factor, but that nevertheless the connection to the insurer/insured relationship was attenu-
ated, at best. Id. at 1555.
98. Contrast this analysis with the one used by the Fifth Circuit below, where the court of
appeals answered the savings clause question with a factual inquiry similar to the one used for the
initial preemption question of whether the law relates to a benefit plan. See supra note 72. The
Supreme Court's analysis allows any common law claim to be preempted if there is any connection
in the claim to a plan, but the claim can be saved from preemption only if the legal basis of the claim
concerns itself only with the "business of insurance" (i.e. never with employee benefit claims). Such
a common law claim does not exist.
This discussion raises the possibility of using a legal inquiry for both questions. This would result
in much less preemption, in the same way as the Pilot Life analysis results in very few claims satisfy-
ing the savings clause. Such an analysis would be unsatisfactory in light of Congress' desire that
ERISA have a wide preemptive effect, but this type of analysis is essentially what this Note proposes
in regard to the remedies available under ERISA. Cf supra note 84.
99. 107 S.Ct. at 1555-58.
100. Ogden v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 571 F. Supp. 520, 523 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
101. Benvenuto v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 643 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.N.J. 1986).
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ing so, the courts have stripped those actions of some of the remedies
they had outside of ERISA. °2
As shown in Part 1, successful punitive damage claims under ERISA
civil actions are very unlikely. As shown in this Part, ERISA preempts
common law actions when the underlying facts relate to an employee
benefits plan, thus denying traditionally available punitive damages.
Clearly, a prospective plaintiff who desires punitive damages will argue
that ERISA should not preempt the state common law cause of ac-
tion. 3 If the claim survives, the common law of the state may provide
punitive damages. Therefore, although the Supreme Court in Pilot Life
stated that any claim clearly relating to a plan was preempted, there can
be situations where that relation is not clear, and the preemption issue
could determine the availability of punitive damages." 4  Typically, a
102. In Powell v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1985),
ERISA preempted all of the plaintiff's state common law claims (for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract).
The court found preemption because all of the claims related to fiduciary responsibility in the benefit
plan administration. The plaintiff was left with only ERISA remedies. Id. at 422. Thus, her claims
for extracontractual and punitive damages, acceptable remedies under the common law actions
brought, became unavailable to her.
103. See, eg., Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
1549 (1987). The plaintiff in Dedeaux sought compensatory and punitive damages based on claims
for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud. The court commented that it was obvi-
ous why he made no ERISA claims: ERISA authorizes no punitive damages explicitly or implicity.
Id. at 1313 n.3.
See also Ogden v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 571 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Mich. 1983) where the plaintiffs
admitted they brought the fraud action in order to insure that punitive damages would be available.
Id. at 523 n.5.
104. See Shaver v. N.C. Monroe Constr. Co., 63 N.C. App. 605, 306 S.E.2d 519 (1983). There
the fraud claim alleged that the employer fraudulently induced the plaintiff's employment by mak-
ing representations about the benefits plan. Although the state court there held that the claim was
not preempted, it is now unlikely that other courts would hold the same, even though the conduct
underlying such a claim concerns employer-employee relations and the connection to plan benefits
and administration is only incidental. See e.g., Haider v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., No. 86-
1245(A) (E.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 1987) (order granting motion to dismiss common law fraud claim based
on alleged misrepresentations of defendant employer made prior to employment to the plaintiff em-
ployee regarding benefits plaintiff would receive upon retirement). The court in Powell v. Chesa-
peake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985), held that the preemption issue
depended on how close the action was to the administration of the plan. See supra note 84. This
reasoning raises the possibility that a claim such as the one made in Shaver could have different
results depending on whether or not the employer administers its own plan.
If a court reasons that preemption depends on the proximity of the culpable conduct to the admin-
istration of the plan, then the preemption question regarding a fraud claim against the employer
could depend on whether or not the employer administers the plan. If the employer administers the
plan, then the employer's fraudulent conduct is conceptually close to the plan and ERISA would
preempt the cause of action. On the other hand, when a plaintiff brings the same claim against an
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court decides the preemption issue as a preliminary matter, then later
decides the punitive damages question as another matter. This approach
effectively ignores the interrelation of the two issues. '
This separate judicial development of the ERISA preemption and pu-
nitive damages issues has led to two anomalous results. First, the success
of a punitive damage claim depends on the coincidences of the circum-
stances. Courts might reach opposite results in judging equally culpable
conduct when one situation involves an employee benefits plan and the
other situation does not."0 6 This inconsistent judicial treatment of pre-
emption might lead to forum shopping."7 Secondly, the possibility that
a common law claim may survive the preemption decision induces some
plaintiffs to bring common law actions because of the limited remedies
available under ERISA. As a result, such plaintiffs defeat the purpose of
employer who does not administer the plan, then the claim may be distant from the plan and not
preempted. This leads to the conclusion that the employer who administers the employee benefit
plan (the one who is more likely to have a conflict of interest and engage in self-dealing) is the
defendant less likely to be subjected to a punitive damages award based on an action for fraudulent
inducement of the employee. See also Sanchez, Punitive Damages Under ERISA, 13 W. STATE U.L.
REV. 413, 432 (1986) (arguing that employers who administer their own employee benefit plans
should be treated differently from other employers in regard to punitive damages).
105. See, e.g., Powell v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985).
The court's discussion on preemption, id. at 421-24, concluded that ERISA preempted all of the
common law claims, one of which was intentional infliction of emotional distress. Then the court
turned to the question of damages, id. at 424-25, and held that since the claims were entirely for
extracontractual and punitive damages, neither of which were available under ERISA, the plaintiff's
claims had been properly dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff was left without recourse to claim compensa-
tion for her alleged emotional distress. See also Bone v. Association Management Serv., Inc., 632 F.
Supp. 493 (S.D. Miss. 1986).
106. For example, ERISA will preempt an action for fraud involving an employee benefits plan
leaving the plaintiff with only the ERISA remedies. The nature of the defendant's conduct becomes
irrelevant because punitive damages are unavailable no matter how egregious the facts are. Simi-
larly, employee benefits could be tangentially related to a common law claim that is not preempted.
See supra note 104.
107. Compare Russell v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983) (claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress preempted, ultimate result that punitive damages unavail-
able) with Benvenuto v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 643 F. Supp. 87, 92 (D.N.J. 1986) (claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress not preempted, but other common law actions pre-
empted). Certainly, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages under a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress would prefer the Benvenuto courthouse.
Although it is now highly unlikely that ERISA will not preempt a common law claim with any
relation at all to an employee benefits plan, it still may not always be clear whether or not a plan is
involved. The Court's recent holding in Fort Halifax, see supra note 93, presents plaintiffs with the
argument that their common law claims related only to employee benefits, and not to benefits plans.
Thus, the outcome of a punitive damage claim can still depend on a particular court's preemption
determination, and different courts could still decide this question differently.
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ERISA's comprehensive statutory scheme of civil actions."' 8
E. Legislative History: What Preemption Did Congress Intend?
The legislative history of ERISA provides little guidance on the puni-
tive damages issue. The drafters referred to the law of fiduciary duty'0 9
and trusts ° and expressed their intent that ERISA would provide a
complete range of legal and equitable remedies;' 11 however, the drafters
made no specific reference to punitive damages." 2 Commentators and
courts have based arguments for and against punitive damages on these
references. " 13
The drafters intended to create a nationally uniform law for all aspects
of employee pension and benefit plans 4 and anticipated that a federal
common law would develop around ERISA.1 5 Because the law is un-
clear on its face, the federal courts have had the responsibility of deciding
108. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
109. Congress intended to impose "strict fiduciary obligations uopn those who exercise manage-
ment or control over the assets or administration of an employee pension or welfare plan, as well as
the provision of adequate reporting and disclosure requirements." 120 CONG. REc. 29, 929 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4734.
110. "The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to these fidu-
ciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts." H. R. REP. No. 533, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess, 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4649. "The
principles of fiduciary conduct are adopted from existing trust law .... These salient principles place
a twofold duty on every fiduciary: to act ... as a prudent man ... and to act consistently with the
principles of administering the trust .... H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4651.
11. "The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and equitable remedies
available in both state federal courts and to remove obstacles which in the past . . . hampered
effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities ... or recovery of benefits due.. . ." S. REP. No.
127, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 4838,
4871.
112. See Stein, Punitive Damages under ERISA: Are Participants Entitled to Awards?, 36 LABOR
L. J. 892, 899 (1985).
113. See, e.g., Brennan's concurrence in Russell, supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. See
also Note, Participant and Beneficiary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Dam-
ages After Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1027-36
(1986); Stein, Punitive Damages under ERISA: Are Participants Entitled to Awards?, 36 LABOR L. J.
892, 897-99 (1985).
114. To avoid conflicting and inconsistent regulations throughout the country, some Congress-
men believed that ERISA had to preempt the field completely. See 120 CONG. REc. 29, 942 (1974)
(statements of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4770-71.
See also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2890, nn.18-20 (1983) (discussing the legislative
history and showing that Congress opted for the most comprehensive preemption alternative).
115. "It is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to
deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." 120
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whether to award punitive damages under any of the ERISA civil actions
in section 502(a)." 6
ERISA can potentially preempt a wide range of civil actions and pre-
clude punitive damages awards."17 Whether the drafters intended such a
result must be questioned. The concerns which gave rise to this federal
legislation arose from the lack of vesting requirements, insufficient fund-
ing of pension plans, lack of reinsurance to cover company shut downs,
lack of profitability provisions, and the need for fiduciary responsibility
and disclosure by those administering plans."' The drafters wished to
increase the rights of employees by imposing strict fiduciary duties on
employers and benefit plan administrators" 9 and by providing the em-
ployees with the civil remedies in section 502(a).' 21 It is doubtful that
these drafters intended for the federal common law to deny a traditional
remedy (punitive damages) to employees under causes of action (e.g.
fraud, infliction of emotional distress, etc.) that were available to them
prior to the enactment of ERISA. Nor is it likely that the drafters in-
tended for plaintiffs to resort to common law actions instead of the ER-
ISA civil actions.
III. SOLUTIONS
A. Previous Arguments
In attempting to answer the question of punitive damages under ER-
ISA, courts and commentators have employed various principles of stat-
utory construction based on the language of section 502(a) itself,121 based
CONG. REc. 29, 942 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprinted in 3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 4771.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
117. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
118. See S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 8-11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEwS 4838, 4844-47. See also supra note 1.
119. See S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 27-35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG, & ADMIN. NEWS 4838, 4863-71.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See supra note 111.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). See supra note 5. Some have argued that equity as referenced in
§ 502(a)(3) [29 U.S.C. § 502(a)(3)] traditionally has not included punitive damages; therefore, ER-
ISA should not provide such relief either. See e.g., Powell v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of
Va., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985); Note, ERISA: Punitive Damages for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743, 751-54 (1985). But see Sanchez, Punitive Damages Under
ERISA, 13 W. STATE. U. L. REV. 413, 420-22 (1986) (pointing out that equity does not entirely
preclude punitive damages).
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on other provisions of ERISA, 12 2 based on ERISA's legislative his-
tory, 12 3 and based on analogies to other federal laws. 124 After the Russell
decision125 trust law principles have predictably received considerable
attention. 126
B. Proposal: Look to the Preempted Law
The independent development of the punitive damages and preemp-
tion issues has denied employees remedies previously available for tor-
tious conduct of employers. As a solution, this Note proposes that the
court examine the underlying nature of any claim brought under ERISA,
or in conjunction with ERISA claims, to answer the issue of punitive
damages. The final determining factor for close cases would be the par-
ticular defendant's conduct.
127
122. Section 501 [29 U.S.C. § 1131] provides for criminal sanctions. Some argue that this deter-
rent precludes punitive damages. See, eg., Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp.
1143, 1169 n.54 (D.D.C. 1986); Note, ERISA: Punitive Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 35
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743, 756 (1985).
The fact that ERISA allows the court to award attorney fees and costs, see supra note 13, removes
the need for punitive damages as a way for funding the litigation. See Note, Participant and Benefici-
ary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Damages After Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1033 n.135 (1986).
123. See, e.g., Brennan's concurrance in Russell, discussed supra at notes 56-60 and accompany-
ing text.
124. One commentator has analogized to other federal laws in order to answer the question of
whether punitive damages are proper under ERISA. See, Sanchez, Punitive Damages Under ERISA,
13 W. STATE U. L. REV. 413 (1986).
125. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 61-62. A commentator has explored the trust law relationship and con-
cluded that courts may award extracontractual damages, but not punitive damages, under ERISA.
See Note, Participant and Beneficiary Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Dam-
ages After Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1014 (1986).
Equity principles normally govern trust law. See A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 197 (3d ed.
1967). Therefore, assuming that equity and trust law principles govern, courts often conclude that
the beneficiary or participant can recover no more than the benefits due. See, e.g., Powell v. Chesa-
peake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780 F.2d 419, 424 (4th Cir. 1985). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 and comment a (1959) (trust law entitles beneficiary to the remedy that
would put him in the position he would have been in, had there been no breach by the trustee). But
see G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 682, at 39-41 (rev. 2d ed. 1982) (conse-
quential and punitive damages recoverable in suits for breach of trust involving malice or fraud); A.
ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 205 (3d ed. 1967 and 1985 supp.) (punitive damages recoverable
upon showing of willful, malicious, or wanton conduct).
127. See supra note 38. The Ninth Circuit in Russell, as well as the other courts that allowed
punitive damages, required actual malice or wanton indifference to the beneficiary's rights before
awarding punitive damages. In other words, the courts were in no way holding that punitive dam-
ages were always available under ERISA; rather, they were just allowing for them to exist in situa-
tions where they had always existed.
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For example, when a claim is for denial of benefits, the action is in the
nature of breach of contract for which a plaintiff traditionally has not
and should not receive punitive damages.12 On the other hand, claims
based on misrepresentations by the employer 29 or outrageous conduct in
the administration of an employee benefits plan130 are traditional tort
actions for fraud and infliction of emotional distress. Punitive damages
are appropriate in such actions.1 31 Between these extremes are actions
based on breach of fiduciary duty1 32 wherein it is unclear whether a puni-
tive damage award is appropriate.1 33 Regardless of the variations in the
traditional common law remedies available under these different types of
civil actions, ERISA preempts them all, precluding any punitive dam-
ages recovery. Consequently, ERISA effectively will alter the remedies
available under a state common law cause of action when the particular
claim happens to relate to an employee benefit plan. 134
A potential problem with this proposal is that each state has had its
own common law; thus, punitive damages may be recoverable on a claim
in one state but not in another state on the same claim. 135 The answer in
ERISA actions would have to depend on the predominate view among
the states with regard to the various types of ERISA claims. Realisti-
cally, this should not be a great problem, especially because Congress
anticipated that a federal common law would develop in ERISA
litigation.'3
6
128. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.4 at 818 (1973).
129. E.g., Monson v. Century Mfg. Corp., 739 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1984); Shaver v. N.C.
Monroe Consts. Co., 63 N.C. App. 605, 306 S.E.2d 519 (1983).
130. E.g., Russell v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983).
131. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.2 at 607 (1973) (fraud actions);
and id. § 7.3 at 528-31 (mental distress actions).
132. See e.g., Moore v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1986).
133. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 at 211-12 (1973) (generally
punitive damages are unavailable in equity), and id. § 10.4 at 684-85 (remedies for breach of fiduci-
ary obligation); see also supra note 126.
134. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
135. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.4 at 12 (1973) (state law ques-
tion determines whether, and under what circumstances, a court should award punitive damages).
136. See supra note 99. This, of course, conflicts with Congress' expressed concern to avoid
inconsistent enforcement of employee benefits law among the states. See supra note 114. But realis-
tically, the punitive damage determination must focus on the defendant's conduct; and if courts
require the level of culpability that the Ninth Circuit's Russell holding required ("actual malice or
wanton indifference"), then there is no danger of inconsistent applications of the law. See supra note
38.
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C. Alternative: Limit Preemptive Effect
Another possible solution involves restricting the scope of ERISA's
preemptive effect. The courts shouldnot be so eager to preempt a com-
mon law cause of action with ERISA in cases where the plaintiff did not
base the claim purely on plan administration. Congress meant for ER-
ISA to govern the administration of employee benefit plans by imposing
fiduciary standards on the management of plan assets, by providing in-
junctive relief to enforce those standards, by providing ready access to
the federal court system, and by permitting participants and beneficiaries
to recover benefits due them along with attorney fees and costs. 1 37 These
features of ERISA provided relief to employees in areas where they pre-
viously had no recourse. There was no need to replace the common law
causes of action that already existed. If the facts of a case support a
claim for fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress, then the
courts should allow the employee or beneficiary to proceed and recover
the appropriate relief, including punitive damages in proper situations.
It is appropriate for ERISA to preempt both a breach of contract
claim, when the action is to recover benefits allegedly due the employee,
and a breach of fiduciary duty claim, when it is based on alleged misman-
agement of plan assets. However, the courts should not foreclose an em-
ployee from the traditional common law remedies when the employer
makes misrepresentations regarding the employee benefit plan or when
the plan administrator's conduct regarding the employee's claims for
benefits is actionable under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current judicial construction of ERISA indicates that punitive
damage awards under ERISA are highly unlikely. Common law actions
such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress, for which
punitive damages are normally available, could potentially bypass ER-
ISA's restriction on punitive damages. ERISA will likely preempt such
common law claims, thereby foreclosing punitive damages.
As a solution to the problem that punitive damage awards depend on
the coincidence of the conduct underlying the cause of action and some
remaining uncertainty of the preemption determination, this Note pro-
poses either that courts allow punitive damages under ERISA, depending
137. See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
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on the conduct underlying the ERISA action, or, as an alternative, that
courts limit preemption such that traditional common law actions re-
main available to an aggrieved employee or beneficiary along with all of
the traditional remedies.
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